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Introduction and summary
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 took a tremendous toll on household wealth
and shattered the sense of financial security for millions of American families.
American households lost more than $20 trillion in wealth (in 2012 dollars) in
the Great Recession, and households still had $10 trillion less in wealth at the end
of 2012 than they had before the crisis.1 This massive wealth decline contributed
to a widespread loss of economic security, particularly among lower-income and
moderate-income families, single women, and communities of color.
This economic insecurity can have long-ranging adverse effects on U.S. economic
growth as American families:
• Invest less in new businesses, which slows productivity growth and innovation
• Save less for large long-term expenses such as retirement and their children’s college tuitions, which leads to less-stable financing for capital investments
• Become less likely than they would with more wealth to switch jobs and careers
when better opportunities arise, which slows employees’ productivity
The bottom line: Economic insecurity from decimated household wealth today
could potentially reverberate through our nation’s economy for a long time
through slower growth, fewer jobs, and lower living standards. Helping households rebuild their wealth should therefore be a top policy priority.
The federal government already uses the tax code to incentivize people to save,
typically through tax advantages for particular forms of savings. Employers and
employees can often deduct their contributions to retirement savings vehicles,
such as 401(k) plans, from their taxable income, and the capital gains in retirement savings plans are not subject to taxation until people withdraw the money.
The federal government loses income tax revenue that it otherwise would have
received while people save and then recuperates some of the lost tax revenue
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when people withdraw money for retirement and then pay income taxes. The
underlying idea is that these tax advantages encourage more people to save more
money for retirement than they otherwise would have. Similar incentives exist for
people to save for health care and their children’s education, but retirement savings incentives are by far the most prevalent and largest tax savings incentives that
the federal government offers.
Yet a closer look at the tax incentives for retirement savings as well as other similar
incentives for health care savings and educational savings suggests that the current
system suffers from two key inefficiencies:
• Upside-down tax incentives: Tax deductions carry a greater value for people
with a high marginal tax rate than for people with a lower marginal tax rate.
A person whose last dollars earned fall into the top income tax bracket, for
instance, faces a marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent. That is, each dollar of a
tax-advantaged contribution to a retirement savings account reduces the taxes
that this person owes to the federal government by 39.6 cents. A lower-income
earner with a marginal tax rate of 10 percent, however, reduces the money they
owe to the federal government by only 10 cents for every dollar that they contribute to retirement savings. The value of the tax incentive is upside down, as it
is almost four times larger for high-income earners—who arguably do not need
much help to save—than it is for lower- and moderate-income earners, who
typically have a hard time saving.
• Savings complexities: Employers and employees can choose from a wide range
of retirement savings vehicles. There are defined-benefit pensions and definedcontribution savings plans, the latter of which come in a whole host of flavors—
401(k)s, 403(b)s, SIMPLEs, SEPs, IRAs, and Roth IRAs, just to name a few.
Moreover, all of these retirement savings plans come with their own rules of
who can save with them, how much money people can save, and when the tax
advantages occur—during the contribution phase, during the investment phase,
or during the withdrawal phase. This complexity often stands in the way of
people taking full advantage of all of the tax incentives available to them.
Because of these two inefficiencies, the federal government is not getting as much
additional savings as it ideally could from the foregone tax revenue. More efficiently
designed savings incentives, however, would generate more bang for the buck, as
people would save more than is currently the case for every dollar in tax incentives.
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We propose to vastly simplify existing savings incentives by turning all existing
deductions into one single tax credit—the Universal Savings Credit. With this
credit, people would receive a flat percent of their contributions to a predetermined savings account, regardless of their income and how much money they owe
in federal income taxes. People can use the savings that they accumulate with the
Universal Savings Credit for a wide range of purposes, such as paying for health
care or education, putting a down payment on a first residence, starting or expanding a business, an economic emergency such as unemployment, and retirement.
We also envision only one set of rules for contributing money, investing money,
and withdrawing money that will govern savings for these purposes, as discussed
further below.
Our goal is to end the current system of upside-down savings incentives and to
streamline savings incentives to make it easier for people to understand what they
can save, how much they can save, and when they can withdraw their money.
Lower-income households, who need more help in saving, will get more help
from the new tax incentives than from the existing ones, and everybody will find it
easier to understand tax incentives. The result of these changes should be moreefficient savings incentives and thus more saving.
More savings are good not only for individuals but also for the economy as a
whole. Building wealth more quickly increases economic security. People will
have more money available for short-term emergencies and for longer-term goals
such as buying a house, starting a business, and sending their children to college.
Greater short-term and long-term economic security should translate into faster
economic growth, as people can better handle changes in the economy. More
economic security will allow people to take a longer-term view and better plan for
possible economic changes such as sending children to college, starting a business,
and switching jobs and careers.
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Inefficiencies in the current system
Existing tax incentives are skewed toward the rich
Existing savings incentives in the federal tax code are mostly deductions from taxable income. Employee and employer contributions into a tax-advantaged savings
plan—primarily into retirement savings vehicles such as 401(k) plans, IRAs, and
defined-benefit pension plans—typically reduce the taxable amount of income
for employees and employers. The money in a tax-advantaged savings vehicle then
accumulates without employers and employees having to pay taxes on the capital
gains in the savings plans. Taxes are due, however, when money is withdrawn for
retirement or other purposes.2
The federal government uses these tax incentives primarily to get people to save
for retirement, but similar tax incentives exist for health care savings—into Health
Savings Accounts, for example, which allow people to pay for health care costs
that are not covered by insurance—and for children’s college education to subsidize tuition payments.
The percentage of the contribution to a tax-advantaged savings plan that can be
deducted from taxable income—thereby lowering one’s tax burden—is determined by a household’s tax bracket: The more a taxpayer makes, the more they
are incentivized to save. The highest tax bracket—for those annually making
more than $400,000 individually or $450,000 jointly—is 39.6 percent.3 Those
Americans fortunate enough to earn more than that sum of money pay 39.6
percent of every dollar above that ceiling in taxes, but they are also able to deduct
39.6 cents of each dollar contributed to an eligible 401(k) or IRA from their total
tax burden. This is also true for contributions to eligible Coverdell Education
Savings Accounts, or ESAs, for anticipated college tuition expenses and eligible
Health Savings Accounts, or HSAs, for savings toward medical care.
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The richest Americans are also those who are most likely to have access to an
employer-sponsored savings plan in the first place, allowing them to build a
healthy nest egg with unneeded tax incentives. Sixty-seven percent of workers
making $70,000 or more a year participate in an employer-sponsored retirement
plan, but that number drops off precipitously for lower-income households. Only
32.4 percent of workers making between $20,000 and $29,999 a year participate
in an employer-sponsored plan, and just 6.9
Figure 1
percent of those making less than $10,000
Total
Employee Participation in Employer Sponsored
4
a year participate. Similarly, higher-income
Defined Benefit and/or Defined Contribution
earners are more likely to get access to health
Retirement Plans, by Annual Earnings
savings accounts—through so-called cafeteria
80%
benefit plans such as tax-advantaged parking
70%
and transportation and child care expenses
60%
from their employers.5
50%

Empirical evidence shows that higher-income
40%
earners only replace nontax-advantaged savings
30%
with tax-advantaged savings—that is, higher20%
income earners would save similar amounts
10%
without savings incentives.6 This inefficiency
means that the federal government may spend
0%
Less than $10,000– $20,000– $30,000– $40,000– $50,000– $75,000+
as much as $92 billion in fiscal year 2013 on
$10,000
$19,000
$29,000
$39,000
$49,000
$75,999
retirement savings incentives for the top quinSource: Craig Copeland, “Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and
Trends: 2011” (Washington: Employee Benefits Research Institute, 2012).
tile of earners alone, without actually increasing
personal savings beyond where savings would
have already been if taxpayers in the top fifth of the income distribution save as
much as they do with or without the federal tax benefits.7
On the other hand, middle-class families in the 20 percent to 30 percent tax brackets are less likely to take advantage of existing incentives because those incentives
do not reward long-term financial planning nearly as well.
The system offers even less help for lower-income Americans, who do not have as
strong of an incentive to save as the rich. Working families in the 15 percent tax
bracket are only able to claim 15 cents for every dollar contributed to a deductioneligible savings plan, and most working families generally do not receive the
benefit of employer 401(k)-plan contributions either. This is in spite of the fact
that they are the families who need the most help to build long-term wealth in
times of economic uncertainty and financial insecurity.
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Indeed, some working-class families pay no federal income tax at all, though they
do pay payroll taxes. This is one of the most important facets of the nation’s progressive system of taxation: The working poor, who struggle to make ends meet on
a day-to-day basis, should not be forced to pay federal taxes beyond their means.
Because their marginal tax bracket is zero percent, however, they are able to
deduct zero percent of money saved toward retirement, education, or health care.
For these Americans, there is no incentive from tax deductions to save toward
their living expenses in retirement.
These upside-down savings incentives result in a pronounced imbalance in who
benefits from the tax deductions on the books. The federal government forgoes
about $140 billion in revenue annually from tax deductions for contributions to
savings, but only 3 percent of that $140 billion goes to the bottom 40 percent of
earners, who need the most help to save. On the other hand, 80 percent goes to
the top 20 percent of earners, with almost 50 percent of the tax subsidies going to
the top 10 percent of earners.8
Academic research also confirms that tax incentives are the least-effective way to
generate new savings in the highest tax bracket of earners.9 These high-income
earners are largely taking advantage of incentives in the tax code to be rewarded
for behavior they would have engaged in anyway.
A potential counterargument may be that low-income Americans would not benefit from savings incentives anyway since they cannot save, as they need to spend
all of their money on life’s necessities. Academic studies have shown, however,
that low-income households can and do indeed save with targeted and progressive
incentives. From March 5 to April 5, 2005, 14,000 tax filers at H&R Blocks in lowto middle-income neighborhoods of St. Louis, Missouri, were randomly assigned
matching offers for IRAs of zero percent, 20 percent, and 50 percent up to $1,000
($2,000 for married tax filers). Only 3 percent of filers took the zero percent
matching offer, while 8 percent and 14 percent of filers accepted the 20 percent
and 50 percent matching offers, respectively. The lower incentive of 20 percent
alone caused nearly three times as many people to sign up for an IRA than the plan
with no incentive at all.10
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A similar experiment in Tulsa, Oklahoma, lends further credence to the willingness of low-income Americans to build long-term wealth, finding that participants
“were capable of planning and implementing their financial goals over a multiyear time horizon.”11 Low-income families were encouraged to set up Individual
Development Accounts, or IDAs, a form of subsidized savings account in which
withdrawals can only be made for certain authorized purposes such as purchasing
a home or starting a business. To incentivize the use of these accounts, withdrawals for purchasing a home were matched at a 2-1 rate and were matched for all
other allowed purposes at a 1-1 rate, with $750 in withdrawals per year eligible
for matching. The program had “significant favorable impacts on asset-building
among low-income persons.”12
The bottom line is that lower-income Americans would likely save more than they
currently do if they received higher savings incentives than they currently do.

Confusion over existing savings incentives results in saver paralysis
The tax code’s incentives to encourage retirement, education, and health care savings are so confusing that even those households that would like to take advantage
of them are deterred from doing so. They find it difficult to find a way through the
red tape created by government incentives and private plans.
The retirement savings system alone is a complex web of accounts and incentives
that is difficult to navigate without the assistance of a financial professional.13 The
confusing nature of this system may be best illustrated graphically. (see Figure 2)
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THE PRIVATE PENSION
SYSTEM IN 2006

Figure 2

Plan Types Available in 2006 in the US Private Pension System
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Source: Pamela Perun and C. Eugene Steuerle, “Reality Testing for Pension
Reform” (Philadelphia: Pension Research Council, 2004)

In order to claim retirement deductions, one must navigate this system—not only
choosing the most effective plan but then also finding and claiming the deductions
that will most effectively reward savings choices. The average household must navigate similar systems in order to decide on and set up a Coverdell ESA or an HSA.
Providing choice is not in and of itself a flaw with the system, but behavioral
economics has shown that overwhelming consumers with choices is effectively
the same as providing no choice at all. Multiple studies elucidate evidence that
choices in some decisions can overwhelm and frustrate consumers, resulting in
consumers choosing the most familiar option—or making no choice at all.14 This
is compounded by the fact that savings decisions can be life-altering for oneself
and one’s family, so individuals are even more likely to abstain from choosing
anything altogether out of a fear of making a choice that could end up damaging
the financial well-being of the household.15
There is widespread agreement across party lines that savings incentives need to be
streamlined. Former President George W. Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform recommended the simplification of savings incentives in the tax code in
2005, as the “piecemeal addition of savings incentives with complicated rules [has]
made it increasingly hard for ordinary Americans to navigate the system while allowing for well-advised taxpayers to take advantage of the code’s many loopholes.”16
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The Universal Savings Credit
balances and simplifies
savings incentives
Balancing incentives
Addressing the upside-down savings incentives and their complexity could create
more savings for millions of middle- and low-income households. Congress should
act to replace the various employer and employee deductions to retirement, health,
and education savings accounts with one Universal Savings Credit, or USC.
Because this incentive is a tax credit rather than a tax deduction, it equally rewards
each dollar saved, whether from a taxpayer in the 39.6 percent bracket or a taxpayer
in the 10 percent bracket. Importantly, the credit will be revenue neutral. That is,
the money to finance it will come from ending the current system of savings incentives. The credit will be a flat matching percent of all contributions to qualified
savings vehicles. The savings incentives will only depend on the amount saved.
What would the credit rate look like? Currently, a taxpayer receives a tax benefit
by deducting the contributions to a retirement savings account, for instance,
from their taxable income. So a taxpayer with income in the 15 percent marginalincome tax bracket as their highest tax bracket who contributes $2,000 to a
retirement savings account lowers the amount of income taxes he or she owes by
$300—15 percent of $2,000. Put differently, the total savings of $2,000 includes
$1,700 of income that the taxpayer would have had even after taxes and an implicit
government contribution to his or her savings of $300. The government essentially subsidized each dollar contributed to a savings account with 17.6 cents—
$300 relative to $1,700—of tax savings.
A tax credit, however, works differently than a deduction. A taxpayer contributes
a fixed amount of money to a qualified savings account, and the government
provides a proportional contribution to that savings account in the form of the
tax credit. The taxpayer will typically claim a credit on his or her annual income
tax filing for the previous year. So a taxpayer in the 15 percent income tax bracket
would need to receive a credit of 17.6 cents for each dollar saved in order to be as
well off as with a tax deduction.
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This is just an illustrative example, but the tax credit for savings should be structured such that most taxpayers will be either as well off or better off with the
Universal Savings Credit than they are with current savings incentives in the form
of tax deductions. Most existing proposals to convert tax deductions into tax credits envision tax credits of about 15 percent to 20 percent across the board to all
taxpayers, up to a predetermined maximum annual savings amount, which would
offer larger savings incentives for the majority of taxpayers than the current system
of deductions does.17 The Tax Policy Center also found that an 18 percent matching tax credit is the equivalent of a 15 percent retirement savings deduction.18
The same study from the Tax Policy Center concludes that a 30 percent credit
across the board would be revenue neutral. That is, the majority of taxpayers
would either receive a larger tax benefit from a tax credit than from the current
system of tax deductions or the credit would have no effect on their tax liability.19
Contribution matches should be progressive so that lower-income earners receive
a relatively larger match, such as a 2-1 match or 1-1 match, assuming sufficient
funds are available.
Taxpayers would receive the government matches, up to a maximum annual
contribution amount. The maximum annual contribution amount would need to
be set once the credit rate is established, such that the Universal Savings Credit is
revenue neutral relative to the existing system of tax deductions. That is, the newly
created system of savings incentives would not cost the government more than
the existing system of savings incentives, but it would be more efficient and thus
generate more private savings from individuals than is currently the case.
Current savings incentives also include the tax-free receipt of realized capital
gains, dividends, and interest payments from investments in a qualified account.
As such, there is an upside-down element to the tax treatment of the investment
gains since capital gains, dividends, and interest payments are subject to some
progressive taxation, with larger investment gains incurring relatively larger taxes.
Taxpayers with larger investment gains consequently receive a proportionally
larger savings incentive due to the current tax treatment of investment gains.
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This comparatively larger tax incentive for higher-income earners when money
is saved is offset by the tax treatment when the savings are spent. All of the past
contributions and investment gains are subject to income taxation once taxpayers
withdraw their money from their accounts. Federal income taxes are still progressive, so that higher-income earners pay a larger share of their income in taxes when
they withdraw money. Our proposal envisions that the tax treatment of investment gains in savings accounts and of withdrawals from such accounts remains
the same as is currently the case.

Simplifying incentives
The Universal Savings Credit will not make any distinction between savings purposes to eliminate the labyrinth of existing savings incentives. That is, people can
use the credit to save for education, homeownership, health care, and retirement.
Allowable reasons for withdrawals from these savings accounts should match
the reasons for existing allowable hardship withdrawals in retirement savings
accounts, including retirement, down payment for a primary residence, an unemployment spell, medical bills, and educational expenses. The flexibility to use
money for a wide range of reasons should encourage people to save more money
than they would have saved in more restricted savings.
There should be a limit for preretirement withdrawals, however, in order to prevent abuse. Households should only be able to withdraw the actual amount necessary for the withdrawal reason, along with a predetermined percentage of their
accrued savings for emergencies before age 62. Starting at age 62, however, households should be permitted to withdraw all of their money for retirement income.
Limiting the amount that people can withdraw from their savings accounts in any
one instance will mean that money will actually be available the next time they
need to dip into their savings and for retirement.
A substantial share of savings could also pass on to heirs, as savers do not always
spend all of their savings during their lifetime. The current system consequently
requires that savers start to withdraw a minimum amount of their savings at a
specific age, typically once they turn 70-and-a-half years old. To limit the public’s
tax liability, USC-eligible account holders should also be required to make a minimum withdrawal when they reach a certain age—say, 70-and-a-half years of age,
which matches the existing minimum-required withdrawal rules for retirement
plans. This would make clear that savings are meant to support people’s incomes
when other income sources are no longer available.
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People can apply the newly created credit to existing savings accounts such as
IRAs and 401(k)s, as well as to defined-benefit pensions, but new contribution
and withdrawal rules will also apply. Contribution rules, for instance, will be the
same for IRAs and for 401(k)s, unlike in the current system, which sets lower
contribution limits for IRAs than for 401(k)s. Savers can also withdraw money
from these accounts for reasons other than retirement. The point of maintaining
existing plans is just to make it easy for people to continue saving in ways that are
already familiar to them.
All savings in accounts that are eligible for the credit should also have default
investment options. These default investment options will automatically apply
unless savers specify other investment options. This will help avoid situations
in which saved money simply sits in an account and does not earn any interest.
Savers will over time experience faster growth with their savings than with holding
money solely in cash.
The Internal Revenue Service should also provide an option for automatic contributions to any savings account eligible for the Universal Savings Credit on annual
tax-refund filing forms. This will increase participation in the savings accounts
eligible for the credit and thus raise people’s savings over time.
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Additional issues related to
the implementation of the
Universal Savings Credit
This report aims to make the argument for ending the existing upside-down tax
preferences that provide the largest savings incentives for households who do
not need much extra help to save and the smallest incentives for households who
arguably need the most help. This report also argues that a change from savings
incentives in the form of tax deductions to refundable tax credits should go along
with a large-scale simplification of existing savings incentives. There are a number
of practical issues, however, that require additional attention.

Trading off maximum contributions and credit rate
This proposal envisions a flat credit for all taxpayers, potentially coupled with a
progressive—larger—credit for lower-income taxpayers. Taxpayers would receive
the credit up to an annual maximum contribution to all accounts combined. The
implementation of the Universal Savings Credit would be revenue neutral relative
to the existing system of tax deductions. In other words, the proposed system of
the Universal Savings Credit likely will change who receives tax benefits for savings but not how much the federal government spends on such incentives.
The combination of revenue neutrality, annual maximum contributions, and a flat
credit rate implies that there is a tradeoff between maximum contributions and the
credit rate. A higher maximum contribution per taxpayer means that more contributions are eligible for the credit, thus reducing the money available for the credit.
Consider a basic numeric example to illustrate this point. Let’s say, for argument’s
sake, that the amount annually available for savings incentives is $100 billion for
2013. The federal government could, for instance, allocate this money as a 33.3
percent credit for all taxpayers, without a progressive match.20 The maximum
amount that all taxpayers together could contribute would then be $300 billion,
since $100 billion is equal to 33.3 percent of $300 billion. Assume again, for argument’s sake, that this means that the maximum amount that any taxpayer could
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contribute and qualify for the credit for each dollar they contribute to a savings
account is equal to $10,000 in 2013—that is, each taxpayer can contribute a
maximum of $10,000 and receive $3,333 as credit from the federal government.
The government may alternatively decide to raise the maximum savings amount
by 25 percent to $12,500. Assuming that this will increase total savings by, for
instance, 10 percent to $330 billion21—or 110 percent of $300 billion—the credit
rate would have to fall to 30.3 percent, since $100 billion—the total amount
available for the credit—is equal to 30.3 percent of $330 billion. The numbers will
obviously not line up this way in reality, but the basic point remains that a higher
maximum allowable contribution will mean a lower credit, and a lower maximum
allowable contribution will mean a higher credit.
Different groups of taxpayers will benefit from either a higher maximum amount
or a higher credit. Most lower- and moderate-income taxpayers will find it difficult
to save thousands of dollars each year and thus will never come close to maximum
allowable amounts, which are currently $17,500 for 401(k) plans, for instance. As
such, a taxpayer who can realistically save only $2,000 per year will not see any
disadvantage from policymakers lowering the maximum contribution amount
from, for instance, $17,500 to $10,000. A credit of 33.3 percent compared to a
credit of 25 percent on $2,000 of annual savings, however, will provide the taxpayer an additional $166 per year in this example. Lower- and moderate-income
taxpayers will most likely benefit more from a higher credit than from higher
maximum contribution amounts.
Higher-income earners will likely benefit from being able to save larger amounts
and receive the full credit for their savings. Let’s say that the choice is between
a maximum contribution amount of $5,000 at a flat credit of 33.3 percent and a
maximum contribution amount of $10,000 at a flat credit of 25 percent. In this
example, a taxpayer who can contribute $10,000 will receive either a credit of
$166.50 or of $250, depending on which combination of maximum contribution
amount and credit rate policymakers choose.
The question is how much more sensitive savings are to changes in the credit rate
compared to changes in the maximum contribution amounts for lower-income
and middle-income households, who need to increase their savings more than
higher-income earners. The a priori assumption is that a higher credit is better
than a lower credit, but the empirical question is where the ideal maximum savings cutoff should be to help lower-income and middle-income households most
in saving for their future. William G. Gale, co-director of the Tax Policy Center,
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concluded in a 2011 study that a revenue-neutral credit, assuming the same
contribution limits as before, would equal 30 percent.22 Lower contribution limits
than currently are in place would allow for either a larger credit for all taxpayers or
for the creation of a progressive match for lower-income taxpayers.

Treatment of existing savings vehicles
The Universal Savings Credit could be applied to any savings account as long as
it is properly regulated by the relevant regulatory agencies, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of
Labor, among others. Contributions to existing savings accounts such as 401(k)
plans and IRAs can qualify for the credit, as can newly created savings accounts.
Existing savings accounts, however, would have to operate under the uniform new
rules that would apply to all qualified savings vehicles. Existing savings vehicles
for retirement, for example, include defined-contribution savings accounts, such
as 401(k) plans and IRAs, and defined-benefit pensions, such as single-employer
pensions and multiemployer pensions. Defined-contribution accounts offer savers
more investment and withdrawal choices, but these choices also come with higher
costs and greater risks than is typically the case for defined-benefit pensions. All of
these savings vehicles could theoretically continue to exist, but they would operate with a uniform maximum contribution amount, a uniform credit for contributions, and a uniform set of default rules for withdrawing funds.23
It is entirely possible that the creation of the Universal Savings Credit, which taxpayers could use in flexible ways to save for whatever purpose is most important
to them, will lead to a proliferation of new savings vehicles. People could theoretically go shopping for savings vehicles that better meet their needs than existing
savings plans since savings would be less tethered to employers than is currently
the case. Financial-service providers could respond to this growing demand by
offering a range of savings plans that currently do not exist. Policymakers could
encourage the creation of low-cost and low-risk savings options where they do
not already exist. The Universal Savings Credit should hence be implemented
jointly with a new type of low-cost account for low- and middle-income households—preferably the Center for American Progress’s Secure, Accessible, Flexible,
and Efficient, or SAFE, plan24—but there are a variety of proposed programs that
would also provide low-income workers with more-secure and lower-cost retirement savings vehicles.25 Any such proposal, joined with the Universal Savings
Credit, would ensure that savers not only save more money but also that their
money is safely invested for future purposes.26
16

Center for American Progress | The Universal Savings Credit

Tracking annual contribution limits
The new system of savings with the Universal Savings Credit will allow savers to
save as much outside of an employer-sponsored savings plan as with an employersponsored savings plan such as a 401(k) plan. The maximum contribution limit
will consequently apply to each taxpayer, not to an individual account. This
requires, though, that some entity will keep track of how much each taxpayer has
already contributed to one or more qualified accounts. It seems easiest to keep
track of all contributions through the IRS, since the tax authority will also administer the payment of the credit by handling a taxpayer’s annual tax return.

The employer-based savings system
The Universal Savings Credit will interact with the existing employer-sponsored
system in different ways since this proposal envisions two critical changes to
the tax treatment of employer-sponsored savings. First, the annual contribution
limit applies uniformly regardless of whether a taxpayer saves in an employersponsored savings plan or not. Second, employers could no longer deduct their
contributions to retirement savings plans so that taxpayers could receive higher
credits than they otherwise would. The proposed credit will be revenue neutral.
Tax incentives that are currently benefiting employers would directly benefit
employees under the proposed credit. These changes may lead some employers
to cut back or weaken their existing retirement savings plans, especially existing
defined-benefit pensions.
But the streamlined savings incentives that will be tied to taxpayers could also
result in larger participation rates in some defined-benefit pensions. The credit
would allow taxpayers to shop around for the best option for their money. There
is no reason why some existing defined-benefit pensions, such as multiemployer
plans in the private sector or public-sector plans, should not be able to offer
retirement savings options to individuals who want to invest their savings and tax
credits with them.27 Some taxpayers who currently do not participate in a definedbenefit plan will want to use their money to get access to these benefits. It is thus
conceivable that the Universal Savings Credit will translate into a greater participation in defined-benefit pensions. That is, the newly created credit could result
not only in more people saving more but also in more people enjoying low-cost,
low-risk retirement benefits.
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Conclusion
The federal tax code should help low- and middle-income Americans struggling
to rebuild the wealth they lost over the course of the Great Recession, but today’s
tax incentives for savings are more of an obstacle than an aid. The current system
is demonstrably skewed in favor of those who actually need the least help building wealth, and it remains so complex that even those low- and middle-income
Americans who are positioned to benefit simply cannot navigate it at all.
The Universal Savings Credit will correct this imbalance and simplify the
system. With this credit in place, the American people can finally begin to shift
from triaging their finances in the short term to building stability and security
for the long term.
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